Phil's advice. Military Council in Fili. Alexey Kivshenko

The day before

On the eve of the council, the Russian army positioned itself west of Moscow to give battle to Napoleon. The position was chosen by General Leontius Bennigsen. Despite the severe fever that tormented him for several days, Barclay de Tolly inspected the battlefield on horseback and came to the conclusion that the position was disastrous for the Russian army. After him, A.P. Ermolov and K.F. Tol came to the same conclusions after driving through the location of the Russian troops. In light of these reports, Kutuzov was faced with the question of the need to continue the retreat and surrender of Moscow (or fight directly on the streets of the city).

Bennigsen, who opened the meeting, formulated a dilemma - to fight in a disadvantageous position or to surrender the ancient capital to the enemy. Kutuzov corrected him that this is not about saving Moscow, but about saving the army, since one can count on victory only if the army remains combat-ready. Barclay de Tolly proposed to retreat to the Vladimirsky highway and further to Nizhny Novgorod, so that in the event of Napoleon’s turn towards St. Petersburg, he would have time to block his path.

In his speech, Bennigsen announced that retreat makes no sense of the bloodshed in the Battle of Borodino. The surrender of the city, sacred to the Russians, will undermine the morale of the soldiers. Purely material losses from the ruin of noble estates will also be great. Despite the growing darkness, he proposed to regroup and attack the Grand Army without delay. Bennigsen's proposal was supported by Ermolov, Konovnitsyn, Uvarov and Dokhturov.

Osterman-Tolstoy, Raevsky and Tol spoke out for the fact that Russia is not in Moscow. The latter pointed out that the army, exhausted by the Battle of Borodino, was not ready for a new, equally large-scale battle, especially since many commanders were incapacitated by wounds. At the same time, the army’s retreat through the streets of Moscow will make a painful impression on the townspeople. To this, Kutuzov objected that “the French army will dissolve in Moscow like a sponge in water,” and suggested retreating to the Ryazan road.

Based on the opinion of the minority of those present, Kutuzov decided, without giving battle in an unsuccessful position, to leave Moscow (for, in his words, “Russia is not lost with the loss of Moscow”) in order to preserve the army to continue the war, and at the same time get closer to suitable reserves . This decision required a certain amount of courage, since the responsibility for surrendering the historical capital to the enemy was very great and could result in resignation for the commander-in-chief. No one could predict how this decision would be received at court.

At the end of the council, Kutuzov summoned Quartermaster General D.S. Lansky and instructed him to ensure the supply of food to the Ryazan road. At night, Kutuzov’s adjutant heard him crying. The army, which was preparing for battle, was given the order to retreat, causing general bewilderment and murmur. The retreat through the city took place at night. The decision to retreat also took the Moscow authorities, led by Count Rostopchin, by surprise.

After two days' marches, the Russian army turned from the Ryazan road to Podolsk onto the old Kaluga road, and from there onto the new Kaluga road. Since some of the Cossacks continued to retreat to Ryazan, the French scouts were disoriented and Napoleon had no idea about the whereabouts of the Russian troops for 9 days.

In the tradition of Tolstoy and Kivshenko, the council is depicted in S. Bondarchuk’s film epic “War and Peace” (1967). For reasons of time savings, among all the council members in the film, only Kutuzov and Bennigsen are given the floor (and the latter speaks Russian on the movie screen, which he did not actually speak).

The hut of the peasant A. Frolov, in which the council took place, burned down in 1868, but was restored in 1887, since 1962 - a branch of the Borodino Panorama museum. The original appearance of the hut is known reliably thanks to a number of sketches made in the 1860s. A.K. Savrasov.

Notes

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A meeting of Russian military leaders, convened by M.I. Kutuzov (see Mikhail Illarionovich KUTUZOV) September 1 (13), 1812 in the village of Fili near Moscow to decide the fate of Moscow. After the Battle of Borodino, the Russian army, due to heavy losses, retreated to... ... encyclopedic Dictionary

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Historical district in Moscow Fili History First mention 1454 Part of Moscow since the 1920s Other names ... Wikipedia

A former village to the west of Moscow (since the mid-20s of the 20th century, within the city limits). During the Patriotic War of 1812, a military council was held in Fili on September 1 (13), at which M. I. Kutuzov, at the suggestion of M. B. Barclay de Tolly, decided to leave Moscow in ... encyclopedic Dictionary

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Prerequisites of the council

On August 26 (September 7), 1812, one of the bloodiest battles of the 19th century took place. The significance for our history is difficult to overestimate. Victory in it would have saved Moscow from ruin and fire, and defeat could have subjugated Russia to the will of Napoleon, but the 12-hour battle ended with an uncertain outcome: there were no clear winners or clear losers. The French emperor himself, in his memoirs, described the result of the Battle of Borodino as follows: “The French showed themselves worthy of victory, and the Russians acquired the right to be invincible...”.

After long weeks of almost non-stop retreat, exhausting rearguard battles, and abandonment of cities, the decisive and fierce confrontation on the Borodino field raised the spirit of the Russian army. Many were ready to continue the battle the next day... But the general situation was such that he was not confident of success in the event of a resumption of the general battle due to the fact that the troops under his command suffered serious losses, needed rest and partially reorganization - it was necessary to replace many commanders who died and retired due to injury, and from the rescript of August 24 (September 5) he knew that in the very near future he could not count on receiving the reinforcements that were so needed at that moment. The position between Fili and Vorobyovy Gory, chosen by the Chief of the Main Staff of the Russian Army L. L. Bennigsen, was criticized by a group of military leaders led by M. B. Barclay de Tolly.

A.K.Savrasov. "Council Hut in Fili"

Advice

To make a final decision on further actions, M.I. Kutuzov convened a military council in the village of Fili. The meeting place of the council was the hut of the peasant Mikhail Frolov. On the evening of September 1 (13), the council members gathered. Among them were M. B. Barclay de Tolly, D. S. Dokhturov, L. L. Bennigsen, N. N. Raevsky, F. P. Uvarov, A. P. Ermolov, A. I. Osterman-Tolstoy and other.

Most of the commanders present shared the opinion of the soldiers about the need to give another battle to Napoleon. According to a long-standing military tradition, the first word was always given to the junior in rank, but Mikhail Illarionovich this time broke it and first gave the floor to Barclay de Tolly, who spoke in favor of continuing the retreat. It was he who wrote the words that Kutuzov really wanted to hear and which are sometimes attributed to him: “Having saved Moscow, Russia will not be saved from a cruel, ruinous war. But saving the army does not yet destroy the hopes of the Fatherland.”

The debate at the council became heated, the issue was a matter of principle, but the generals could not come to a consensus. The decision was made by the commander-in-chief himself: the army must be preserved at all costs to continue the fight, Moscow will have to be abandoned.

Afterword

After the council in Fili, the Russian army moved towards Moscow. The troops thought that they were going around to the site of a new decisive battle, but soon everything became clear. With bitterness, but in perfect order, the regiments passed through Moscow on the Ryazan road. History has fully confirmed the genius of Kutuzov's decision. The army was preserved, a month later the enemy left Moscow, and by the end of the year the last French occupiers were driven out of Russian soil.

An interesting fate unfolded at the house of the peasant Mikhail Frolov, where the military council was held. In 1868, the hut burned down, but was restored in 1887. The appearance of the “Kutuzovskaya Izba”, as local residents called it, was preserved due to the fact that it was captured by A.K. Savrasov in sketches. Much better known is the painting by A. D. Kivshenko “The Military Council in Fili in 1812,” but it was painted after the fire. Since 1962, it has been a branch of the Battle of Borodino panorama museum.

Interest in the events of 1812 has not subsided in our country for many years. A special role in this is played by the educational activities of the Russian Military Historical Society, which constantly returns to these events in its affairs. Military history camps “Borodino” are organized annually, where young people from all over the country gather; Special exhibitions and programs are being prepared, and performances by reenactment clubs are being organized. We invite you to take part! You can find out more in the “Poster” section.

Kivshenko A. D.
Military Council in Fili in 1812
1880
Canvas, oil. 92 x 164
State Russian Museum

The plot of the picture reflects an important event in Russian history at the beginning of the 19th century - a meeting of military leaders convened by Mikhail Illarionovich Kutuzov on September 1 (13), 1812. The great Russian commander, taking into account the heavy losses in the Battle of Borodino, at a military council in the village of Fili supported the proposal made by Barclay de Tolly leave Moscow without a fight for the sake of preserving the army. He said: “By leaving Moscow, we will save the army; by losing the army, we will lose Moscow and Russia.” M.I. Kutuzov found the strength to courageously make this decision for the sake of preserving the army, foreseeing that, thanks to the strategy he had chosen, in the future Napoleon’s army would face inevitable defeat. According to Kutuzov's plan, the army moved along the Ryazan road, and then secretly crossed to the Kaluga road, performing the Tarutino march-maneuver. During the 20 days of staying in the fortified Tarutino camp, 84 kilometers south of Moscow, the Russian army was replenished with people, weapons and equipment, military partisan detachments and “flying corps” were sent behind enemy lines. All this decided the outcome of the war and confirmed the insight and talent of the great Russian commander.

On the canvas, the artist depicted the moment of a dispute between M.I. Kutuzov and a number of generals led by the chief of staff L.L. Wenigsen, who spoke out for the battle of Moscow. The picture shows (from left to right): P.S. Kaisarov, M.I. Kutuzov, P.P. Konovnitsyn, N.N. Raevsky, A.I. Osterman-Tolstoy, L.L. Bennigsen, M.B. Barclay de Tolly, F.P. Uvarov, K.F. Tol, D.S. Dokhturov, A.P. Ermolov. The author of this work, A.D. Kivshenko, was not a participant in famous events, but the masterful description given by L.N. Tolstoy in the novel “War and Peace” served as a reason for him to use the plot from the military events of 1812 for his diploma work. The artist created a deeply psychological work, captivating with the truthfulness and emotionality of its means of expression, which makes the picture one of the best paintings of Russian historical painting of the second half of the 19th century.

Kivshenko Alexey Danilovich
1851, Tula region - 1895, Heidelberg, Germany

The son of a serf, owned by Count D.V. Sheremetyev, from the age of 9 he was sent to study in St. Petersburg, to the drawing school of the Society for the Encouragement of Artists (class of I.N. Kramskoy), and in 1867 he continued to master his skills at the Imperial Academy of Arts (IAH). He was awarded gold and several silver medals. 1880-1884 he worked in Düsseldorf, Munich and Paris, creating a number of interesting paintings. 1884 - trip to the Transcaucasian region to collect material for a film about the Turkish war (1877-1878), commissioned by Emperor Alexander III. In 1891 - participant in an archaeological expedition (led by N. Kondakov) to Palestine and Syria. The artist also visited Germany, Austria, Italy, Turkey, and the countries of the East, capturing landscapes, architecture, and people’s everyday life in his watercolors. He taught at the Imperial Academy of Arts, at the school of Baron Stieglitz. The artist created works in the best traditions of Russian fine art of the second half of the 19th century, taking a worthy place among such famous artists as I.M. Pryanishnikov, I.N. Kramskoy, V.V. Vereshchagin, V.I. Surikov and others.

In the village of Fili west of Moscow. The question was brought up for consideration: whether to try to fight near Moscow after the Borodino battle had not revealed a winner or to leave the city without a fight.

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✪ Military Council in Fili (narrated by historian Alexander Valkovich)

✪ War of 1812. Unknown pages. Council in Fili

✪ Barclay de Tolly and Bagration

Subtitles

The day before

On the eve of the council, the Russian army positioned itself west of Moscow to give battle to Napoleon. The position was chosen by General Leonty Bennigsen. Despite the severe fever that tormented him for several days, Barclay de Tolly inspected the battlefield on horseback and came to the conclusion that the position was disastrous for the Russian army. After him, A.P. Ermolov and K.F. Tol came to the same conclusions after driving through the location of the Russian troops. In light of these reports, Kutuzov was faced with the question of the need to continue the retreat and surrender of Moscow (or fight directly on the streets of the city).

The council was attended by generals M. B. Barclay de Tolly, L. L. Bennigsen, who was delayed on the way, D. S. Dokhturov, A. P. Ermolov, P. P. Konovnitsyn, A. I. Osterman-Tolstoy, N. N. Raevsky, who was late, K. F. Tol, F. P. Uvarov, as well as General P. S. Kaisarov, who was on duty that day. No minutes were kept. The main sources of information about the council are the memoirs of Raevsky and Ermolov, as well as a letter from N. M. Longinov to S. R. Vorontsov in London.

Bennigsen, who opened the meeting, formulated a dilemma - to fight in a disadvantageous position or to surrender the ancient capital to the enemy. Kutuzov corrected him that this is not about saving Moscow, but about saving the army, since one can count on victory only if the army remains combat-ready. Barclay de Tolly proposed to retreat to the Vladimirsky tract and further to Nizhny Novgorod, so that in the event of Napoleon’s turn towards St. Petersburg, he would have time to block his path.

Barclay de Tolly was the first to speak in the debate, criticizing the position near Moscow and proposing to retreat: “By preserving Moscow, Russia is not saved from a war, cruel, ruinous. But having saved the army, the hopes of the Fatherland are not yet destroyed, and the war... can continue comfortably: the troops being prepared will have time to join in different places outside Moscow.”

Based on the opinion of the minority of those present, Kutuzov decided, without giving battle in an unsuccessful position, to leave Moscow (for, in his words, repeating Barclay de Tolly, “Russia is not lost with the loss of Moscow”) in order to preserve the army to continue the war , and at the same time get closer to suitable reserves. This decision required a certain amount of courage, since the responsibility for surrendering the historical capital to the enemy was very great and could result in resignation for the commander-in-chief. No one could predict how this decision would be received at court.

Details Category: 1812 Published: September 13, 2012 Views: 12456

The United Russian Army under the command of Field Marshal General His Serene Highness Prince M.I. On September 13 (1), Golenishcheva-Kutuzova set out from the village of Mamonovo and moved towards Moscow. Before reaching the capital, two miles from the Dragomirovskaya outpost, the troops set up bivouacs.

The suitable troops were located in positions chosen by the cavalry general, Count Bennigsen. The right wing of this position adjoined the bend of the Moscow River in front of the village of Fili, the center was located between the villages of Volynskoye and Troitskoye, and the left wing of the army was supposed to stand on the Sparrow Hills. The rearguard of the army under the command of General Miloradovich was located near the village of Setun.

Field Marshal Kutuzov, having determined the position of the troops, arrived at Poklonnaya Hill, where an observation deck with a bench was prepared for him. The generals hurried to get acquainted with the area to decide whether it was suitable for a battle, and gathered to meet the commander-in-chief who was waiting for them.

Many considered the position chosen for the battle by Count Bennigsen to be very unfortunate. The heights at which the troops were supposed to be stationed have gentle slopes on the side of the direction along which the enemy would advance. And behind our troops in the center and on the left wing the slopes are quite steep, which significantly complicates maneuvering, the approach of reserves and the possibility of retreat.

The position of the Russian troops is cut across by several ravines, making it difficult, and in some places practically depriving different parts of the army of the possibility of communication with each other. Especially the right wing, which is cut off from the center by the Setun River.

The army reserves did not have the opportunity to position themselves secretly behind the heights, on steep slopes. The Moscow River flows at its base, and beyond it stretches, as far as the eye can see, the capital itself. Therefore, both battle lines and reserves could only be positioned on ledges facing the enemy, in open space. The depth of the formation of troops was very small, and the entire position of the battle line and reserves could be shot through by enemy artillery.

If our army is forced out of its position, the troops will simply be thrown off steep cliffs into the Moscow River and overturned into the city.

General Barclay de Tolly, who was suffering from a severe fever that day, nevertheless rode around the positions chosen by Bennigsen on horseback. In his “Notes” he described the selected positions as follows:

“They surprised me. Many positions were separated by impassable ravines, in one of which a river flowed, completely interrupting communication. The right wing was adjacent to a forest extending several miles to the enemy’s side, which gave him the opportunity to take advantage of the superiority of his riflemen, take possession of this forest and bypass us from the right flank.

Behind the first line of the left wing there was a ravine, ten to fifteen fathoms deep, with steep slopes that it was hardly possible to cross it alone.

The reserve of the right wing stood so close that any enemy cannonballs could hit all our four lines, and the reserve of the left wing, cut off from the battle lines by the mentioned ravine, would remain an idle spectator of the defeat of the troops in front, without being able to support them. The infantry of this reserve could at least shoot at the enemy, hitting their own in the meantime, while the cavalry, deprived of any opportunity to take part in the battle, must either immediately flee or remain inactive until destroyed by enemy artillery.

The position stretched for almost four miles; the army, weakened by the Battle of Borodino, having occupied its entire length, would have been stretched out like a spider's web. Behind there was a river, and beyond it a vast city. On this river, 8 bridges were built on ships, above and below the city, but I must note that the descents to the bridges built above the city were so steep that only infantry could get off them. If defeated, the entire army would be destroyed to the last man."

Convinced that the position is unprofitable? Barclay de Tolly hurried to Poklonnaya Hill to see Prince Kutuzov, and, meeting General Bennigsen, told him his comments about the chosen position, and then expressed his thoughts to Kutuzov. After listening to Barclay, the commander-in-chief asked the opinion of Toll, who also said that he would never have chosen such a position for battle. After this, General Ermolov spoke out, who very emotionally assessed Bennigsen’s choice and said that the position has “great shortcomings and is hardly possible to maintain it.”

Kutuzov ordered Tolya, Ermolov and Colonel Krossaromm to once again inspect the position and report on the shortcomings.

Work on the construction of fortifications continued on Poklonnaya Hill, but the movement of troops assigned to occupy the Sparrow Hills was suspended. Count Rostopchin, the Moscow mayor, arrived at Poklonnaya Hill. During a conversation with Kutuzov, Rostopchin allegedly said that leaving Moscow, the troops would see a burning city behind them.

Returning after touring the position, Ermolov once again told Kutuzov that the place was not suitable for battle. To Kutuzov’s question: “Would it be impossible to retreat from the position to the Kaluga road?” General Ermolov replied that the enemy would not give such an opportunity.

At 5 o'clock in the afternoon Kutuzov convened a military council in the village of Fili, at which there was one question - about the fate of Moscow. The council was attended by generals Barclay de Tolly, Bennigsen, Dokhturov, Uvarov, Osterman-Tolstoy, Konovnitsyn, Raevsky, Ermolov, Tol and Kaisarov. General Miloradovich could not arrive, since he did not have the opportunity to leave the rearguard of the army.

Barclay de Tolly insisted that it was impossible to fight in a position in front of Moscow, and advised a retreat along the road to Nizhny Novgorod. General Tol proposed taking a different position: the right wing of the troops should stand towards the village of Vorobyovo, and the left wing towards the new Kaluga road, in the direction between the villages of Shatilovo and Voronovo. And if necessary, retreat to the old Kaluga road.

Next, General Ermolov spoke out, who agreed with Barclay de Tolly in everything except the withdrawal towards Nizhny Novgorod. According to Ermolov, in this case the troops will lose the opportunity to communicate with the armies of Tormasov and Chichigov. But in the end, Ermolov said that knowing the mood in society, it is necessary to give battle in front of Moscow.

Bennigsen firmly insisted on the battle and the impossibility of leaving Moscow without a fight. “It’s a shame to give up the capital without firing a shot; if we decide to do this, won’t it mean that we lost the Battle of Borodino,” said Bennigsen.

Generals Dokhturov, Uvarov, Ermolov and Konovnitsyn agreed with Bennigsen’s opinion. General Raevsky believed that if the chosen position does not allow giving battle and bringing all the troops into battle, then it is necessary to move towards the enemy.

(In Kivoshchenko’s painting “Military Council in Fili” the following are depicted from left to right around the table: Kaisarov, Kutuzov, Konovnitsyn, Raevsky, Osterman-Tolstoy, Barclay de Tolly, Uvarov, Dokhturov, Ermolov, Tol, Bennigsen.)

General Osterman-Tolstoy supported the opinion of Barclay de Tolly that it was impossible to fight. Kutuzov, after listening to the opinions of all the council participants, said: “With the loss of Moscow, Russia is not yet lost, I make it my first duty to save the army, get closer to reinforcements and, by the very concession of Moscow, prepare the enemy’s inevitable death, and therefore intend to, having passed Moscow, retreat along the Ryazan road.” This statement was reflected by General Kaisarov on duty in the journal of the Main Army.

The issue of leaving Moscow without a fight was resolved. Kutuzov decided to conduct a flank retreat from the Ryazan to the Kaluga road, as General Tol had previously proposed.

After the military council in Fili, a disposition was drawn up for the 1st and 2nd Western armies on September 14 (2), 1812 to move along the Ryazan road to the village of Panki.

“The 1st and 2nd armies set out at 3 o’clock in the morning along the Ryazan road to the village of Panki in two columns.

The 1st or right column under the command of Infantry General Dokhturov consists of the 2nd Cuirassier, 8th, 7th and 6th Corps and the 4th Cavalry Division, goes with the left flank to the Kaluga outpost and, having passed the city , goes to the Ryazan outpost, then continues the march along the Ryazan road to the village. Punks; the cuirassier division immediately follows the artillery.

The 2nd or left column under the command of Lieutenant General Uvarov consists of the 1st Cuirassier, 5th, 3rd, 2nd and 4th Corps and the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Cavalry Corps, goes with the right flank to the Dorogomilovskaya outpost and, having passed the city, goes to the Vladimir outpost, from where along a country road it goes out onto the large Ryazan road, keeping on the left side of the road, continues its march to the village of Panki. The cuirassier division immediately follows the artillery.

The quartermasters of the regiments immediately go along the Ryazan road to the village of Paiki, where they report to Major General Vistitsky.

The main apartment is in the village. Punks.

The 1st and 4th cavalry corps do not move out until the rearguard begins to retreat.

It is confirmed by all corps, division and other commanders that during the passage of troops through Moscow, not a single person or lower rank dares to leave their ranks, which, if it turns out, will immediately be ordered to be stabbed to death, gentlemen, the commanders are held accountable for any disorder during the passage through Moscow with the strictest collection.

Chief of the Main Staff, Major General Ermolov."

On September 13 (1), Major General Ushakov received orders from Commander-in-Chief Kutuzov to move to the Ryazan road, where he would link up with the army.

Emperor Alexander the First sent to General A.P. on September 13 (1). Tormasov received a rescript on his appointment as commander of the 2nd Western Army in connection with the wounding of General Bagration near Borodino:

“In the famous victory won over the imp. Napoleon General-Feldm. book Kutuzov near Borodin, to everyone’s regret. from inf. book Bagration was wounded in the leg by a bullet. For this reason, I find your movement to the 2nd Army necessary. I am sure that everywhere and in any case you will give me the opportunity to recognize your zealous service with new awards.”

On the same day, September 13 (1), the Emperor sent a secret rescript to Prince Kutuzov, in which he informed of the decision made to unite the 3rd Western Observation Army of General Tormasov and the Moldavian Army of Admiral Chichagov, and of the appointment of the latter as commander of this united army.

“The approach of the brave Moldavian army to unite with the 3rd Western Army and the importance of the present circumstances force me to draw attention to the need for one commander to lead them. Of the two, in sincerity with you, I admit that Admiral Chichagov is more capable due to the determination of his character. But I don’t want to upset General Tormasov, and therefore I find it more fitting to summon him to the armies led by you, as if on the occasion of the wound of Prince Bagration.

Upon the arrival of General Tormasov, it will be up to you to use it according to your consideration, and the loss that occurred in the memorable battle of Borodino in the 2nd Army may serve as a pretext for you not to divide these two armies into two, but to consider them as one. Then you can entrust General Tormasov with a reserve or another unit, at your best discretion. Keep this rescript secret, so as not to offend General Tormasov, who is highly respected by me.”

Sources:

1. Major General M. Bogdanovich “History of the Patriotic War of 1812 according to reliable sources”, St. Petersburg, 1859. Volume 2.

2. M.I. Kutuzov. Collection of documents. T. 4. Part 1. M., 1954

The material was prepared by columnist Alexander Lear.